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The Constitutionality of Blue Ribbon Juries
Although sovereignty of states over matters primarily of local concern narrows the Supreme Court's function in reviewing state procedures, the Court has been increasingly concerned with the procedural
side of state criminal law enforcement during the past fifteen years.'
Among those subjects to which review has been extended lately are the
right of the defendant to counsel, 2 coerced confessions,3 the introduction
of perjured testimony by the prosecution, 4 and access to the courts.5
The purpose of this paper is to deal only with the problem of jury
selection and to explore briefly its constitutional environment in order
to determine the constitutional restrictions on state procedures.
Jury Requirements for the Federal Courts
Insofar as the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions it was intended
to be declaratory of the common law right as it existed at the time of
the Amendment's adoption. 6 The following characteristics were among
those included in the time-honored concept of jury trial as guaranteed
by that Amendment: (1) the jury must be impartial in its feelings as
between defendant and state; (2) it must be summoned from the district
where the crime was committed; (3) the verdict must be unanimous;7
(4) the jury must be protected from the influence of interested parties.
1 Boskey and Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure (1945)
13 U. of Chi. L. R. 266; Moore, Due Process of Law in "Race" Cases (1944) 2 Nat.
B. J. 240.
2

Foster v. Illinois, ...

U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1716 (1947); Powell v. Alabama, 287

U. S. 45 (1932). See note infra p. 375 of this Journal, Limitations on an Accused's
Right To Counsel.
3 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
4 Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213 (1942).
5 Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U. S. 255 (1942)
6 The English common law was not, however, the sole source of the trial system of
the States. See Colvin, Participation of the United States of America with the
Republics of Latin America in the Common Heritage of Roman and Civil Law, 10
Proceedings of the Eighth American Scientific Congress 467; 1 Johnson, The Swedish
Settlements on the Delaware (1911) 450 et seg. While proclaiming trial by jury to
be the "glory of the English law"' Blackstone carefully observed that it was but a
"privilege". 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (15th ed. 1809)
350. It was incorporated into the Constitution of the United States as a right. 2
Story, Constitution (4th ed. 1873) §1779.
7 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 676, 677. U. S. Const. Amend.
VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed... 2.
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In order that the jurors display the required impartiality it has been
thought desirable that they be a group representative of the locality
from which they are chosen. With respect to state jury selection procedures this feature has become a focal point of constitutional controversy, not under the Sixth Amendment, but under the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is a
result of decisions holding that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are
not directly applicable to state procedures. 8 The standards of jury selection which the Supreme Court has set up recently are imposed only
on the federal system.9
Constitutional Limitations on State Procedures
The first eight Amendments to the Constitution were considered at the
outset to be applicable only with reference to the federal government,1 0
but the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment might reasonably
have been construed to extend the protection of the Bill of Rights to
the citizens of the several states under the privileges and immunities
clause." It was soon held, however, that the provision afforded protection only to those privileges and immunities inherent in federal as distinguished from state citizenship.1 2 Now it is well-settled that a state
has full control over the procedures of its courts both in civil and
criminal cases subject only to the qualification that such procedure does
not conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution so as to work a denial of "fundament rights."' 3 Consequently
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment have become the only constitutional restrictions on the adoption
or exercise of criminal procedures by the states.
Under the due process clause some of the rights guaranteed by the
first eight Amendments, being part of our common heritage of fundamental rights, have been held to apply as against the states."I The
difficulty, obviously, is in deciding which rights are fundamental and
which are not. According to Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut' 5 the criterion is that such provisions of the Bill of Rights as are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are likewise embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment.
8 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 9G (1876) (Seventh Amendment, jury trial in civil
cases); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1885) (Second Amendment, right to keep
and bear arms); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1889) (Fifth Amendment, indictment for infamous crime; Sixth Amendment, trial by jury in criminal prosecutions).
9 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217 (1946); Ballard v. United States,
315 U. S. 60 (1946). Cf. Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1941).
10 Barron v. Mayor and the City of Baltimore, 32 U. S. 243 (1833).
11 U. S. Const. Amend. XIV §1 " * * No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States...7.
12 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 394 (1872); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.
78 (1908).
13 Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172 (1899).
14 First Amendment: De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364 (1936) (freedom of
assembly); Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 268 (1941) (freedom of speech and
press) ; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639
(1942) (freedom of religion). Sixth Amendment: Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45,
67 (1932) (right of accused to have counsel) ; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97,
105 (1933) (right of accused in criminal cases to be informed of the charge against
him).
15 302 U. S. 319 (1947).
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In the recent case of Adamson v. California' the Supreme Court
held that the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amend17
ment was not drawn under the protection of the due process clause.
Four justices,' 8 however, contended that the Bill of Rights was intended
by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to be made applicable to
the states, 19 and one denied the validity of either20 view, urging that the
It may be expected
due process clause has an independent potency.
that this cleavage will continue for the present, at least; but as the
make-up of the present Court changes it is not unlikely that more rights
will be called fundamental and held guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
As it stands now the right to trial by jury in a state proceeding is
not a privilege of national citizenship, nor is it such a fundamental right
2
as to be guaranteed by the Federal Constitution against state action. '
22
The often-stated dictum reasserted in the Palko case, that a state
might do away with trial by jury altogether so long as the trial as conducted met those essential standards of fairness inherent in the concept
of due process, has never been tested. Since the "standard of fairness"
criterion depends upon the current Supreme Court's notions of civilized
practice it is hard to believe that the concepts of due process and right
to trial by jury would not merge, should a state attempt to abolish the
jury system. Although such an attempt is not likely to be made, jury
23
trial having long been a part of our national and state tradition,
have helped to fortify decisions
subsequent references to this dictum
2
reached on due process grounds. '
Most of the cases which have been appealed to the United States
Supreme Court on the ground of improper selection of grand or petit
jurors in state criminal proceedings have involved the exclusion of
Negroes from jury lists.2 5 All 'of the cases in which the interference of
the Court with state procedures has been successfuly invoked have in16... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1672 (1947).

17 Accord, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
18 Justices Black, Douglas, Rutledge, and Murphy.
, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 1684 (1947) (Black,
U. S.
19 See Adamson v. California,
J., dissenting).
20 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion insisted: "The Amendment
neither comprehends the specific provisions (of the Bill of Rights) . . . . nor is it
confined to them. * ** The relevant question is whether the criminal proceedings ....
offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples.. 2' See Id. at 1678, 1682, 1683.
21 See: Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S.
90 (1876); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1899).
22 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 332 (1937).
23 See note 6 supra.
, 67 S. Ct. 1613 (1947) ; Cf. Louisiana ex rel.
24 Pay v. New York, ... U. S ...
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 (1946).
25 Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226 (1904) (systematic exclusion of Negroes from
jury service); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935) (no Negro had served on
jury in county since 1907) ; Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613 (1938) (no Negro summoned for service on grand or petit juries in county for thirty years except on one
occasion) ; Pierre v. Louisiana, 305 U. S. 354 (1939) (none for forty years); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940) (subtle but nonetheless systematic exclusion). But cf.
Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638 (1905) (exclusion of professional men and others
not a denial of due process).
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volved a violation of federal "civil rights" statutes. 26 Objections to the
composition of juries have thus far been upheld only where the defendant was a member of the excluded class, although the Court has
intimated that in a proper fact situation it might relax this rule. 27 In
such cases the burden of proof is upon the defendant to establish not
only a systematic exclusion of a class, but also that such exclusion was
intentional. 28 Nothing less than complete exclusion of members of the
class has sufficed to establish either a violation of the federal statutes or
denial of equal protection or due process. 29 While the negro-discrimination cases have involved infractions of federal statutes, recent cases
suggest that discrimination in selection of jurors on account of race is
a violation of equal protection of the laws irrespective of the applicability of the statutes. 30
The Fay Case
This is the background against which Fay v. New York 31 was decided. Two labor union officers were found guilty of extortion by a
special or so-called "blue ribbon" jury in a New York state court.
They appealed their conviction primarily on the ground that the New
York statute 32 providing for selection of the special jury was so administered as to deny the petitioners due process and equal protection.
This contention was based on the allegations that members of the labor20 18 Stat. 336, 8 USCA §44 (1875) "No citizen possessing all other qualifications
...
. shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or any State on account of race or color .... "
27 See Fay v. New York, ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1628: "Assuming that
defendants, not being women, have standing to complain of exclusion of women from
"
the general and special jury panels, we are unable to sustain their objection. * * *
The use of such language would seem to be unnecessary were the justices convinced
that in no case could a defendant complain of the exclusion of a class unless he be
a member of that class.
28 Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945) ; Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278 (1908).
29 In Akins v. Texas 325 U.S. 398 (1945), it was contended that jury commissioners limited to one the number of Negroes on the jury list merely to give the
appearance of Negro representation. The Court held that the defendant had failed
to provide clear proof of a deliberate limitation of the number of Negro jurors.
Whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the limitation of Negroes to the
proportion that their eligible number bears to the total eligible persons was left
undecided.
30 See: Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) ; Alkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
31 ... U.S ..., 67 S.Ct. 1613 (1947).
32 Judiciary Law §749-aa., 29 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York
Annotated 511-516:
"§749 aa.3. Examination as to fitness; subpoena; punishment for disobedience. No
person shall be selected as a special juror until he shall have been examined personally
by the county clerk, his deputy or secretary as to his qualifications and fitness to serve
as a special juror. Such county clerk may issue a subpoena requiring any person
within such county to attend before him, his deputy or secretary at a time specified
for the purpose of testifying concerning the qualifications or fitness of himself or
any other person to serve as a special juror and the propriety of the selection of
such juror. * * * In case of his failure to attend and testify as required by such
subpoena or a refusal to be sworn or to answer any legal or pertinent question, he
shall be punished therefor by any justice of the supreme court as a contempt of
court. * * * The county clerk, in the record made by him of the jurors selected)
as such special juries, shall enter the age of each special juror so selected, his
business or vocation, if any, the length of his residence in the state and county
and, if naturalized, the date of his naturalization. Such record shall be a public
record and shall be open to inspection."
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ing class were systematically and deliberately excluded from such juries
and that women were likewise excluded. Petitioners further contended
that they were denied equal protection of the laws on the ground that
juries selected from the special panel were more inclined to convict than
those from the general panel. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions and affirmed the verdict of the state court, four justices dissenting.
This was not the first time that the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the New York law. Soon after the enactment of the
original special jury statute the Court rejected an attack upon it
which was made on the ground that the jury "was taken from a particular body of citizens and not from the general body of the county"
thus denying the defendant due process and equal protection. 33 The
Court in the Fay case was willing to reopen the question of the constitutionality of the special jury system and the administration of the
New York statute "in the light of more recent trends of decision and
of particular facts about the present operation of the jury system not
advanced in support of the argument in the earlier case.'"'4
No specific standards as to education and employment qualifications
of special jurors are set out in the New York statute. Jurors are
selected from those accepted for the general panel by the county clerk
35
after testifying under oath as to their qualifications and fitness.
Obviously the clerk has wide discretion in his selection. While the
statutory purpose is plainly to select persons of higher than average
intelligence who are able to handle intricate factual issues the scheme
manifestly would permit selection of persons from a high economic and
social stratum to the exclusion of those from lower economic and social
levels. Although evidence was offered from which it was inferable
that the standards employed by the clerk were of an economic and
social nature, the defendants failed to prove to the satisfaction of
the majority that the distribution of the jury panel occupationally
was not the result of the application of legitimate standards. 36 Consequently the Court decided that the state might apply tests of intelligence, citizenship, and understanding of English even though a disproportionate37number of the laboring class were thereby excluded from
jury service.
Neither was the Court willing to set aside the conviction on the
ground that the proportion of women on the jury panels did not equal
their proportion of the population. There is no constitutional requirement that women be on the jury. Rather the proposition is based on
33 Hall v. Johnson, 186 U. S. 480 (1901) ; of. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172
(1899) ("struck jury" statute held constitutional).
34 Fay v. New York, ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1619 (1947).
35 See note 32 supra.
36 A table presented by the defense showed that the special jury panel included
only 0.2% craftsmen, foremen, service workers, and laborers, while 99.8% were professional persons, proprietors, managers, sales, and clerical workers. Of the last
named group, comprising 38% of the special jurors, three were union members who
were peremptorily challenged. Evidence that there was no discrimination as to occupation in the selection of the panel was uncontradicted directly. The showing of
lack of proportional representation of laboring groups was made without the necessary proof of purpose to discriminate against the groups themselves.
Failure of a statute to set forth any standards for selection of jurors does not
render it constitutionally invalid. Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U. S. 101 (1895);
Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U. S. 161 (1909).
37 Fay v. New York, ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1613. 1629.
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a changing view of the rights of women in our public life. While the
Court may insist on their inclusion on federal juries,38 woman jury
service has not become so much a part of the customary law of the
land that failure of the states to follow the practice can be considered
a denial of equal protection or due process.3 9 The Court further
pointed out that Congress has considered the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to state jury selection procedures and has found
only discriminations involving race and color deserving general legislative condemnation. Therefore one who would have the courts
intervene on grounds not covered by the statute must prove clearly
that in his own case the procedure
was so arbitrary that it denied him
40
equal protection or due process.
In support of their allegation that special juries are more inclined
to convict than general juries the defendants offered in evidence reports by the New York State Judicial Council recommending abolition
of special juries.4 1 However, these reports were made partly on the
basis of studies made over ten years ago; and the Court took the
position that the evidence was not sufficiently recent to avail the defendants in this case. 42 Still the Court indicated that if it were clearly
proved that a greatly disparate ratio of conviction had continued for
a substantial length of time, a defendant, in the absence of explanation,
could complain of this inequality as a denial of equal protection of the
laws even if it were shown that a special jury court43never had convicted any defendant who did not deserve conviction.
The same four justices who dissented in the Adamson case 44 also disapproved the majority decision in the Fay case, being of the opinion
that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits a state from convicting any person by use of a jury which is not
impartially drawn from a cross-section of the community." 45 More consistently the minority might have said that such a right is inherent in
state citizenship by virtue of the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment
jury trial provisions into the guarantees of the Fourteenth. They did
not suggest that use of the special jury in this case subjected the defendants to a trial so lacking in fairness as to be a denial of due process.
conclusion
If, in any given case, it can be proved that a substantial number of
any class, qualified to act as jurors, have been systematically and deliberately excluded from jury service because of race, color, occupation,
38 Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187 (1946).
39 Fay v. New York, ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1628, 1629 (1947).
40 Id. at 1625.
41 A study of homicide cases by the New York State Judicial Council revealed that
in 1933-1934 special juries convicted in 83% and 82% of the cases while juries
selected from the general panel convicted in only 43% and 37%. Fourth Annual
Report of the Judicial Council of the State of New York (1938) 46. In 1945 the
Council recommended that the special jury be abolished inasmuch as the improvement in the quality of jurors generally removed the need for special jurors. Eleventh
Annual Report of the Judicial Council of the State of New York (1945) 49, 50.
42 Fay v. New York, ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1626.
43 Ibid.
44 See note 18 supra.
45 See Pay v. New York, ... U. S. ... , 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1632 (1947) (Murphy, J.
dissenting).

